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Abstract – Securitisation has been one of the main reasons for the global financial crisis. 
The securitisation business has experienced a steep decline for two decades until an even 
stronger decline in the summer of 2007. This article analyses the regulatory developments 
in the structured market and the measures taken by legislators since the crisis to address 
the shortcomings in the securitisation market. The main problems are centred around four 
areas, which are analysed separately: first, misalignment of interests between investors 
and originators; second, inadequate capital rules failing to reflect the actual risk 
exposures; third, insufficient disclosure and information overload of investors; and fourth, 
credit rating agencies failing to give quality ratings. It concludes that while the adopted 
regulatory measures might have less corrective effects than envisaged, this is favourable 
as long as the precise consequences of the adopted measures are not clear. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Securitisation has been identified as one of the causes that aggravated the 
2007-2008 global financial crises (GFC).1 It is defined by the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD)2 as a transaction tranching the credit risk of 
an asset exposure. Thereby, it is essential that the payment of the asset 
exposure determines the payment in the transaction, and that absorption of 
losses is determined by the subordination structure of the tranches. 3 
Generally, the sponsor will initiate the process, through which the 
underlying assets are transferred by the originator to a securitisation special 
purpose entity (SSPE). The SSPE in turn issues different classes of securities 
in tranches to investors via an underwriter. The success or failure of a 
security’s issuance will largely depend on how a credit rating agency (CRA) 
has rated each tranche, which reflects the creditworthiness of the underlying 
assets and the securitisation structure.4 Various types of assets such as 
residential mortgages (residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)) or 
                                                
* Market Infrastructure Specialist at the European Central Bank, Target2Securities, and 
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1 David Ramos Muñoz ‘In praise of small things: securitization and governance structure’ 
(2010) 5(4) CMLR 363, 366. 
2 Council Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions, consolidated version [2006] OJ L177/1 (CRD). 
3 CRD, art 4(36).  
4 Ramos Muñoz (n 1) 365. 
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asset-backed securities (ABS) can be securitised. If the RMBS exposure is 
securitised multiple times, a more complex product such as collateralised 
debt obligations (CDO) or CDO squared or cubed is created.5  
The legislator has taken a piecemeal approach towards the regulatory 
framework concerning securitisation.6 At the international level, non-binding 
legal rules and principles have been agreed upon by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), which are then implemented into binding 
European law. The national legislator needs to transform European 
directives into national law unless a regulation has been adopted at the 
European level. Basel I to III contain the BCBS recommendations.7 The 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) represents the respective European 
binding law of Basel I and II and has been amended twice thus far by CRD2 
and 3.8 Basel III will be implemented under the CRD4 package, the proposal 
for which is expected to be implemented on 1 January 2014 at the time of 
writing. It consists of both a directive and a regulation (CRR)9 – the singe 
rule book – which would replace the former CRDs. In the United Kingdom 
(UK), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (formerly Financial 
Services Authority, FSA) transforms most of the CRD and its amendments 
into national law, which it does within its handbook, the Prudential 
Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms (BIPRU). 
Therein, the PRA has adopted an intelligent copy-out approach, using the 
                                                
5 For a more detailed explanation of the various securitisation structures, see Steven L 
Schwarcz ‘Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis’ (2008) 3 Utah LRev 
1109, 1111f .  
6  David Ramos Muñoz ‘Living on the Edge: Securitization Supervision and 
Characterization Problems’ (2009) 6(5) ECL 217, 211. 
7 Basel I refers to BCBS, ‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards’ (July 1988); Basel II refers to BCBS, ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework. Comprehensive Version’ 
(June 2006). 
8 Council Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions, consolidated version [2006] OJ L177/1 (CRD); Council 
Directive 2009/111/EC of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 
2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain 
own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management 
[2009] OJ L302/97 (CRD2); Council Directive 2010/76/EU of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the 
trading book and for resecuritisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration 
policies [2010] OJ L 329/3 (CRD3). 
9 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms’ COM(2011) 
452 final (CRR proposal). 
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precise wording found in the CRD. Chapter 9 of the BIPRU is the relevant 
part dealing with securitisation.10 
The securitisation market has become increasingly developed over the 
past forty years. By 2011, it had grown to USD7 trillion of US mortgage-
related securities and to over USD2.2 trillion in non-mortgage-related 
ABS.11 This sharp increase is due to the fact that the securitisation process is 
advantageous for many participants. The traditional banking system was 
based on an ‘originate-to-hold’ model (OTH-model). Banks would grant a 
loan to a borrower, for instance a mortgage, and had to hold it on their 
balance sheet until it was fully repaid. The drawback of this model was that 
it caused liquidity shortages in that it prevented banks from further lending 
owing to capital adequacy requirements introduced by Basel I in 1988.12 
This liquidity shortage could be tackled by a new innovative process: 
securitisation. It cleared the banks’ balance sheets and provided them with 
fresh funds, enabling them to grant new loans to borrowers, which were then 
securitised again. Thus, the originate-to-distribute model (OTD-model) was 
born,13 building the foundations of a long-lasting, ascending and accelerating 
period of development. 
Nevertheless, the rise of this newly established trend cannot solely be 
attributed to the OTD-model, it is also the result of stakeholders, other than 
the involved banks, profiting from the structure. From the beginning, the US 
Government supported securitisation as it provided a mechanism to expand 
home ownership throughout the country. 14  For financial institutions, 
sponsoring securitisation transactions provided a considerable income fee.15 
More importantly, it allowed them to manage and reduce their own credit 
risk.16  Consequently, banks were now enabled to continue and further 
increase lending under the capital requirements.17 It was also considered 
                                                
10  Leonard Ng, ‘Changes to Basel II and the EU capital requirements Directive: 
implications for securitisation’ (2010) 25(6) JIBLR 265, 266. 
11 Dan Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ 
(2011) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 49/2011, 41, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916649. 
12 Jan Job de Vries Robbé, Securitization Law and Practice, In the Face of the Credit 
Crunch (Kluwer Law International 2008) 406f. 
13 Ramos Muñoz (n 1) 367. 
14 Awrey (n 11) 42. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Vittoria Cerasi and Jean-Charles Rochet, ‘Rethinking the Regulatory Treatment of 
Securitization’ (2011) Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2008-21, 2, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1170982. 
17 Ibid, p. 3; Awrey (n 11) 42. 
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beneficial to manage and overcome liquidity shortages. 18  Finally, 
securitisation responded to a growing appetite for risk among investors 
looking for higher yields, allegedly at low risk, and a diverse investment 
portfolio.19 
In a bullish market, those benefits had outweighed the drawbacks; 
however, in a bearish market, as in the summer of 2007, the drawbacks 
aggravated and became visible, worsening the financial crisis. Four main 
shortcomings in the securitisation process have been identified. First, 
research finds that the OTD-model caused a misalignment of interest 
between originators and investors. Credit institutions lacked incentives to 
engage in proper screening of loan-level data and to adhere to thorough 
underwriting standards.20  In contrast, under the traditional OTH-model, 
banks had sufficient incentives to conduct proper due diligence of its debtors 
in order to reduce the default rate of their outstanding loans.21 Second, 
regulatory capital requirements did not differentiate between traditional 
securitisation and more complex resecuritisation products, despite the latters’ 
increased riskiness and need for liquidity. Many financial institutions were 
exposed to greater credit losses during the GFC than expected.22 By holding 
the positions in the trading instead of the banking book, they could 
circumvent higher capital requirements, which in turn allowed banks to 
increase lending and securitisation capacities.23 Third, CRAs played a crucial 
role in the boom of the subprime market as high ratings attracted both 
regulated and unregulated financial institutions, as well as meant higher 
profits for sponsors and originators, who could pay lower interests for high 
rated tranches.24 However, they had to downgrade a significant number of 
                                                
18 Ramos Muñoz (n 6) 217. 
19 Awrey (n 11) 42. 
20 Cerasi (n 16) 2 referring to Sinan A. Cebenoyan and Philip E. Strahan, ‘Risk 
Management, Capital Structure and Lending at Banks’ (2004) 28(1) JBF 19; Benedikt 
Goderis and others, ‘Bank Behavior with Access to Credit Risk Transfer Markets’ (2006) 
Tilburg University CentER Discussion Paper No. 100, available at 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/dgrkubcen/2006100.htm; Bernadette A. Minton, René 
M. Stulz and Rohan M. Williamson, ‘How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to 
Reduce Risk?’ (2006) Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2006-03-001, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=785364; Darrell Duffie, ‘Innovations in Credit Risk 
Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability’ (2008) BIS Working Paper No. 225, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1165484.   
21 Ramos Muñoz (n 1) 367. 
22 Cerasi (n 16) 2f. 
23 Awrey (n 11) 42f. 
24 Lawrence J White, ‘Credit-Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Less Regulation 
of CRAs is a Better Response’ (2010) 25(4) JIBLR 170, 174. 
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investment grade ratings in the aftermath of the crisis, as a result of the 
rapidly increasing default rates of the higher rated tranches that were 
considered to be lower risk. This shows that CRAs failed to maintain 
information symmetry and to give unbiased quality ratings, which is 
considered to be the result of a mixture of problems: conflict of interests, 
increasing complexity of (re-)securitised products, and regulatory and 
investor over-reliance. Fourth, investors failed to perform their role in 
understanding their investments and assessing the respective 
creditworthiness themselves. Over-reliance on CRAs can be seen as a cause 
of negligent behaviour, insufficient loan-level disclosure by originators, and 
information overload.25  
  Around six years have passed since the GFC broke out in the summer 
of 2007. Much ink has been spilt over the causes, reasons and shortcomings 
of the crisis, and the resulting need for regulatory reform. Now, it is time to 
analyse if and how those shortcomings have been addressed. The objective 
of this paper is to analyse the current status of regulatory reforms concerning 
securitised products and to identify the remaining problems that either have 
not been addressed yet or that emerge as a result of the new measures. To 
achieve this objective, the four shortcomings identified above will be 
discussed in separate sections. Part B will discuss the misalignment of 
interests and risk retention requirements, Part C the changes in relation to 
regulatory capital requirements, Part D the new disclosure, transparency and 
standardisation requirements, and Part E the legislation addressing the 
shortcomings regarding the failures of the CRAs. Within each section, the 
problems as they materialised in the GFC will be described and the main 
scholarly debate will be presented. Against this background, the regulatory 
solutions will be analysed so that the shortcomings of the current regulatory 
approach can be identified.  
 
B. ALIGNMENT OF INCENTIVES AND RISK RETENTION 
The advantage of securitisation, allowing the originator to transfer its credit 
risk exposure to investors willing to invest in the credit risk, has turned into a 
disadvantage in that it has led to some originators adopting lower screening 
and underwriting standards towards the underlying assets. The underlying 
rationale of this deficiency has been that the interests of originators and 
investors were not properly aligned. The former had little interest in 
                                                
25Awrey (n 11) 43. 
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investing efforts into proper due diligence, knowing it would transfer the 
credit risk exposure to the latter, which in turn possessed insufficient 
information and control about the process and underlying loan portfolio. 
This so called originate to distribute model (OTD-model) created a moral 
hazard problem and the misalignment of interests between originators and 
investors was identified as one of the shortcomings of the securitisation 
process.26 
Any regulatory solution will have to strike a balance between the 
parties’ interests: the investor wants to be sure that the originator has 
undertaken proper due diligence concerning the underlying assets and 
therefore needs to be in a position to assess the originator’s efforts;27  the 
originator wants to be able to transfer and diversify its risk exposure and 
raise new finances.28 Thus, the objective is to align these two interests. 
 
1. Retention level 
To align the investors’ and originators’ interests, the European Commission 
(hereafter: Commission) has suggested that the OTD-model is constrained 
by restricting the originator to fully transfer its credit risk exposure. It is 
supposed to retain a nominal exposure of five percent,29 which is referred to 
as ‘skin-in-the-game’ approach. 30  CRD2 introduced the retention 
requirement at European level in article 122a CRD, which was implemented 
in the UK in BIPRU s9.15 and which entered into force on 1 January 2011 
for newly securitised products.31 To ensure its adherence also by non-EU 
originators, the burden of proof lies with the investing credit institution. It 
has to ensure that the originator discloses the relevant information regarding 
compliance with the retention requirement and non-hedging of the retained 
exposure.32 The rule states that a credit institution is only to invest in 
                                                
26 Ng (n 10) 266; see also: Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), ‘Impact 
Assessment’ on Art. 122a (30 October 2009) para 3, available at 
http://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16106/CEBS-2009-232-final-%28Impact-
Assessment---Retention-in-Securitisation%29.pdf.  
27 Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), ‘Call for a technical advice on 
the effectiveness of a minimum retention requirement for securitisation’ (30 October 
2009) para 81, available at http://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16106/Advice.pdf.  
28 John Kiff and Michael Kisser, ‘Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention’ (2010) 
IMF Working Paper 10/74, 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578672. 
29 CEBS advice on risk retention, paras 1-2. 
30 Ng (n 10) 266. 
31 ibid; grandfathering rules apply for existing securitisations until 31 December 2014; see 
also CRR proposal, art 394(1). 
32 BIPRU, s9.15.5; Ng (n 30) 267. 
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securitised products if either the originator, the sponsor or the original lender 
(hereafter: originator) has retained a net economic interest of not less than 
five percent in the securitised assets on an on-going basis. Thereby, it is 
important that the retention rule will only apply if the investor is a credit 
institution. If the investors were non-regulated entities such as hedge funds, 
then the retention requirement would not have to be adhered to by 
originators. 
While the mandatory nature and the five percent level of the retention 
requirements are new, originators already retained an interest on a voluntary 
basis in the form of credit enhancement before the GFC.33 They chose to 
expose themselves to varying degrees to the first loss pieces by way of 
holding the equity tranche (ie subordinating themselves to more senior 
tranches) with the aim of enhancing the credit rating of more senior tranches 
and to attract more investors.34 Hence, in light of originators already having 
undertaken retention before the GFC voluntarily, the actual effect of the new 
rule will strongly depend on the adequacy of the chosen level. If it is not 
higher than the previously voluntary level chosen, the effect may be smaller 
than envisaged.  
 In the CRD a one-size-fits-all approach was chosen by setting the 
level to five percent, which will have to be maintained on an on-going basis. 
However, little evidence exists on the adequacy of this level.35 Based on 
limited availability and quality of data, CEBS 
 (now EBA) identified that in the UK retention levels varied from 1% to 
14.4% depending on the type of underlying assets. According to a wholesale 
banker, levels even amounted to up to 25% due to investor pressure;36 here, 
the new requirement had only an effect on a few originators. In Continental 
Europe, CEBS identified that credit institutions were retaining between 0.8% 
and 4.6% of first loss tranches;37 here, the prescribed level of five percent 
would potentially be more effective. CEBS refrained from suggesting to 
raise the incentive level above five percent as no evidence would exist that a 
higher level would align the interests better. In contrast, to circumvent the 
rule originators could either internalise the increased costs accompanying the 
higher retention level and transfer it to the investors, or reduce the overall 
                                                
33 Kurt Eggert, ‘The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown’ 
(2009) 41(4) ConnLRev 1257, 1307. 
34 CEBS advice on risk retention, para 8. 
35 Ibid, para 82. 
36 Interview with a banker, Lloyds TSB Bank plc (London, 31 August 2012).  
37 CEBS art 122a impact assessment, paras 6-15. 
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level of securitisation.38 Hence, CEBS points out that the effectiveness of the 
skin-in-the-game approach is improved by accompanying it with other 
measures such as disclosure and due diligence requirements than by 
increasing the retention level.39 
 
2. Retention methods   
To retain the five percent the legislator provides a choice of four methods: 
holding five percent of each tranche (vertical slice), holding five percent of 
the nominal value of the exposure in case of a revolving structure, holding a 
random selection of exposures, or holding five percent of the equity 
tranche.40 The chosen method can neither be changed during the life of the 
securitisation nor can be applied cumulatively.41 
The precise effect of each of the four methods is yet unclear. CEBS 
argues that no method prevails over the other as none is short of drawbacks 
depending on the situation run through.42 The scholarly debate affirms this 
perception. Fender and Mitchell analyse the screening effects on the 
originator of the vertical slice, the equity tranche and the mezzanine tranche 
method. They conclude that if an economic downturn is very likely the 
equity tranche would lose its screening effect as the originator knew it lost 
its retained interest in any case. Instead, they suggest that holding the 
mezzanine tranche would ensure proper due diligence even in an economic 
‘low state’ even though it would be less effective in the ‘high state’ of the 
economy.43 On the other hand, Kiff and Kisser disagree based on their model 
and argue that holding the equity tranche would result in the greatest 
screening efforts by the originator, provided that the originator could decide 
both on screening efforts and the retention level. This is due to the fact that 
Fender’s and Mitchell’s findings were dependent on economic conditions: 
the loan pool’s quality, its default probability and the thickness of the 
retained tranche. Moreover, Kiff and Kisser note that the originator would 
                                                
38 CEBS advice on risk retention, para 81-87. 
39 Ibid, para 7; a similar view is taken by Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, ‘Incentives and 
Tranche Retention in Securitisation: a Screening Model’ (2009) BIS Working Papers No. 
289, 34, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481663.  
40 BIPRU s9.15.4; CRD, art 122a(1). 
41 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, ‘Guidelines to Article 122a of the 
Capital Requirements Directive’ (31 December 2010) para. 32, available at 
http://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/106202/Guidelines.pdf.   
42 CEBS advice on risk retention, para 10. 
43 Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, ‘Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: a 
Screening Model’ (2009) BIS Working Papers No. 289, 19, 33, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481663; CEBS art 122a impact assessment, paras 28-30. 
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generally not hold the equity tranche voluntarily as it would come along with 
greater capital costs.44 Instead, it would choose the least costly method,45 or 
if pressurised by sophisticated investors the vertical slice as it would 
guarantee the greatest skin-in-the-game in all economic situations.46 As an 
alternative to the four methods available, the L-shaped method as a mixture 
of holding the mezzanine and equity tranche is currently being discussed by 
regulators.47 CEBS considers it to be the second best solution but delays its 
implementation to the point in time once a more thorough assessment will be 
conducted.48 As a result, each method’s precise effectiveness of incentivising 
screening is yet unclear. Originators will choose the overall least costly 
method and exploit arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, the methodologies 
will need to be reassessed as soon as sufficient data exists in order to identify 
which retention method meets the objective best. 
 
3. Optimal retention level and method remain to be found 
Consequently, the OTD-model and the total risk transfer by originators 
resulted in improper screening of the underlying assets to the detriment of 
investors. In contrast, investors were not given sufficient information so as to 
assess the asset portfolio themselves. It is suggested that this misalignment 
of interests may be rectified by means of the five percent retention 
requirement, which aims at incentivising the originator into proper screening 
and underwriting. The originator has to disclose details on its retention 
method chosen, thereby enabling the investor to verify whether the 
requirements are met as otherwise he would not be allowed to invest. 
However, both regulators and scholars remain equivocal about which 
retention method is most effective as research indicates that it varies 
according to the economic climate and the asset types. Yet, sophisticated 
investors tend to require vertical slice retention. In turn, this would explain 
why so much discretion is left to the originator, who can be expected to 
choose the cheapest method and take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. 
Moreover, it can only be concluded that the five percent level is at best an 
approximation. Overall, it seems to depend on the market and types of 
financial institution whether the level is lower or higher than the previous 
                                                
44 Kiff (n 28) 28f. 
45 CEBS art 122a impact assessment, para 27. 
46 Lloyds banker interview (n 36). 
47 CEBS art 122a impact assessment, para 32. 
48 Ibid; Metin Kaptan, ‘On the Optimal Design of Risk Retention in Securitisation’ (2011) 
16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923075, arguing the opposite: high retention 
levels for highly-ranked tranches and low retention levels for low-ranked tranches. 
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voluntary retention levels; no evidence or research is available justifying that 
it would be the optimal level. The failure to distinguish between the riskiness 
of the different underlying assets also provides arbitrage opportunities.49 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the retention requirement is likely to be 
the first step in the right direction but that adjustments will have to be taken. 
Both European and national regulators should undertake an effectiveness 
assessments of the current rules as soon as sufficient data is available so as 
to minimise arbitrage opportunities and to ensure that the retention rules 
indeed align the originators’ and investors’ interests. So far, it is only certain 
that the originators’ risk transfer and diversification opportunities are 
restrained thereby. Another moral hazard problem lies in the fact that 
investors become overconfident in the retention requirement’s effectiveness 
and stop investing resources in their own due diligence. The consequences 
we do not know yet about due to insufficient knowledge might even be 
worse.  
 
C. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
The GFC revealed that credit institutions were undercapitalised to meet all of 
their going concern liabilities. This was also the case for (re)securitisation 
exposures. The original idea of securitisation was to diversify risk for 
financial institutions by transferring it to non-banking investors and at the 
same time reduce costly bank capital. However, in practice risk exposures 
were not diversified but either sold to other banks’ proprietary trading desks, 
retained via derivative contracts, used as collateral or resecuritised. 50 
Resecuritisation proved to be especially prone to disguise risk and to cause 
underlying correlation.51 To ensure that risk exposures did not result in high 
capital requirements in banking books, exposures were hold in the trading 
book. Against the latter, less capital had to be hold according to Basel II on 
grounds that its assets would be more liquid and could easily be unwound.52 
However, the crisis revealed that this was not the case. In addition, 
overreliance on Value-at-Risk (VaR), used to estimate the probability of a 
                                                
49 CEBS art 122a impact assessment, para 25. 
50 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Turner Review, A regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis’ (London, March 2009) 15f, available at  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.  
51 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009) 87(2) 
WashULRev 211, 223; Financial Services Authority, ‘Strengthening Capital Standards 3’ 
(Consultation Paper, CP09/29, December 2009) para 5.51 (FSA CP09/29).  
52 David Ramos Muñoz, The Law of Transnational Securitization (OUP 2010) para 7.211. 
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specific loss level, failed to capture low probability high loss events.53 Thus, 
resecuritisation proved to be more risky and required more liquidity. The 
difference in capital charges between trading and banking book were used to 
circumvent the capital rules and gave arbitrage opportunities to financial 
institutions.  
 
1. Defining and risk-weighting resecuritisation exposures 
Sophisticated products such as resecuritisations were in need of more 
liquidity than originally expected.54 As credit losses became more correlated 
in cyclical downturns, resecuritisations were more affected than 
securitisations due to their inherent structure: their underlying assets are 
generally composed of low-rated (e.g. BBB) securitisation exposures. To 
address this increase in risk, BCBS suggested discouraging the issuance of 
complex structures by increasing the bank capital retained for complex 
products.55 However, hitherto neither the Basel II Framework nor national 
laws distinguished between the different types of complex structured 
products, i.e. securitisation and resecuritisation.  
Before discussing the new and stricter rules for resecuritisation 
exposures, the limits of capital requirements should briefly be displayed. 
Kashyap et al highlight the limits of what capital requirements can do. Apart 
from that they will be burdensome on the banks’ business by increasing 
costs, they will also increase incentives for regulatory arbitrage as long as 
there is financial innovation. 56  Ayadi has questioned the overall 
appropriateness of the prescribed risk-weights and whether they would not 
strongly be politically driven.57 For instance, Basel I assigned 100% for all 
ABS except RMBS, which were risk-weighted with 50%. Hence, it should 
be born in mind that also this means of regulatory intervention has its limits.  
In light of the emerging necessity to distinguish between the two types 
of securitisation from a capital regulatory point of view, CRD3 has 
introduced in line with Basel III a new definition for resecuritisation. In 
                                                
53 FSA Turner Review, 58. 
54 Peter Went, ‘Basel III Accord: Where do we go from here?’ (2010) 6, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693622.  
55  Bank of International Settlement, ‘BCBS the Joint Forum, Report on asset 
securitisation incentives’ (BIS, July 2011), 58 (BIS securitisation incentives).  
56  Anil K Kashyap, Raghuram G Rajan and Jreemy C Stein, ‘Rethinking Capital 
Regulation’ (Symposium by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City on ‘Maintaining 
Stability in a Changing Financial System’, Jackson Hole, 21-23 August 2008) 23, 26. 
57 Rym Ayadi, Emrah Arbak and Willem P de Groen, ‘Implementing Basel III in Europe: 
Diagnosis and avenues for improvement’ (6/2012) CEPS Policy Brief no. 275, 4, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2098932. 
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essence, it constitutes a securitisation of a securitised tranche, such as a CDO 
of ABS. The legislative scope is very wide, as no materiality threshold 
exists. It suffices that only one underlying exposure constitutes a 
securitisation exposure.58 The definition has retroactive effect and hence 
applies to existing resecuritisation positions.59 Owing to the wide scope, 
advisors of credit institutions have emphasised the necessity to review their 
existing securitisation exposures of their clients to ensure that they are not 
affected negligently by the higher capital requirements applicable to 
resecuritisation.60 
Essentially, the capital requirements for securitisation exposures are risk-
sensitive to the exposure’s default probability. The default risk is expressed 
in a credit quality rating of the secured product, which can either be 
determined by an external credit assessment institution, such as a CRA, or 
internally depending on the approach adopted by the credit institution. Each 
credit rating, referred to as credit quality step, matches a risk-weight 
percentage in order to reflect the exposure’s probability of default. 61 
Concerning the number of credit quality steps, the internal rating based 
(IRB) approach is more nuanced than the long-term standardised approach 
(STA). In line with the BCBS approach, CRD3 increases the risk-weight for 
resecuritisation exposures. Under the STA, a risk-weight of 40% for AAA to 
AA- rated products to up to 650% for BB+ to BB- (against 20% and 350% 
respectively for securitisation) is applied.62 A similar increase is made for 
banks using the IRB approach though it is a bit more favourable. For unrated 
products such as first-loss pieces nothing has changed. The capital amount is 
to equal the exposure, reflecting a risk-weight of 1,250% (called deduction 
level). Hence, the legislator has discouraged but not prohibited the issuance 
of complex resecuritised products by increasing their risk-weights and 
ultimately the capital to be retained for those exposures. This has contributed 
to a decrease in the issuance of resecuritised products.63  
                                                
58 CRD, art 4(40a); Financial Services Authority, ‘Strengthening Capital Standards 3, 
further consultation on CRD3’ (Consultation Paper, CP 11/09, March 2011) para 3.6ff 
(FSA CP11/09). 
59 FSA CP11/09, para 3.18. 
60 Morrison & Foerster LLP, ‘CRD3 Changes to Trading Book, Resecuritisations and 
Securitisations Disclosure’ (2010) December News Bulletin, 2, available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/2101123-CRD3-Changes-to-Trading-
Book.pdf. 
61 Ramos Muñoz (n 52) 335f. 
62 BIPRU s9.11.2R; Ng (n 30) 271. 
63 Lloyds banker interview (n 36). 
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2. Trading book adjustments 
 The former trading book treatment originated from the 1990s in the Basel I 
amendments and was later taken over to the Basel II Framework. 64 
Thereunder, credit institutions had to retain a lower capital level against their 
risk exposures than in their banking book as those exposures were allegedly 
more liquid and to be unwound more easily. The market risk was considered 
to be reasonably lower, also for securitisation positions. Through VaR, the 
maximum overnight loss at a given confidence and probability level could 
be calculated. This helped credit institutions to estimate the capital level 
required which generally would be lower. However, the VaR model was not 
immune against model risk. It failed to capture ‘high loss low probability’ 
events which according to the model should not have occurred anytime 
soon. However, they did and the capital level proved to be insufficient. 
(Re)securitisation exposures were especially affected thereby. In the 
downward economical climate securitisation exposures proved to be 
unwound less easily than expected. In combination with the liquidity 
shortages, it was found that those positions should have been held in the 
banking book instead.  
To remedy that financial institutions held securitisation positions in 
the trading book instead of the banking book and thereby attracted lower 
capital requirements, CRD3 has introduced that the capital requirements for 
securitisation positions in the trading book are equal to the banking book.65 
Model risk will be eliminated through the introduction of such standardised 
/fixed capital charges.66 More importantly, it eliminates the basis for capital 
arbitrage. Hence, by equalising the capital charges for securitisation 
positions in the trading and banking book, the legislator adopts resolute 
measures to remedy previous arbitrage opportunities. In turn, it will result in 
a reduction of business activities or in the increase of capital levels for credit 
institutions. 
 
3. Reduction of overall securitisation level 
The broad definition of resecuritisation in combination with the higher risk-
weights has at least contributed to an overall reduction in origination of 
                                                
64 FSA Turner Review, 58. 
65 Commission, ‘Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies’ (Impact Assessment) SEC(2009) 974 
final, 14f (CRD3 impact assessment); Morrison (n 60) 3. 
66 CRD3, recital 34. 
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resecuritised products. As the precise effects are difficult to measure yet, the 
reduction can also be the result of investors realising that resecuritised 
products such as CDS are little profitable in the long term. Nevertheless, the 
basis of the increased risk-weight levels should be ascertained. BCBS bases 
them upon empirical evidence but fails to give more detailed information.67 
It remains unclear by how much BCBS aims to discourage the issuance of 
complex structures. It can only be held that risk-weights were not set as high 
as to totally discourage resecuritisation issuance as therefore levels would be 
to set at deduction level.68  
However, the original overall minimum capital requirements hold by 
banks were the result of negotiations instead of scientific calculations and in 
the aftermath of the crisis proved to be too low. Given the FSA attests that 
no optimal answer exists so far,69 the author concludes that the increased 
risk-weights are probably not optimal either.  If that were the case, both 
Ayudi and Kashyap would be right to point out the potential for arbitrage 
opportunities,70 which could undermine the effectiveness of the system in 
the long run. In addition, the overall level of securitisation including classic 
securitisations is likely to reduce given that more capital will have to be hold 
against securitisation positions in the trading book as well as a result of the 
retention requirements. In times of capital shortages, it is unlikely that credit 
institutions are in a position to increase their capital levels. Thus, the 
regulator should closely monitor the impacts of the adopted measures so as 
to ensure that all consequences are anticipated. However, currently the 
impression remains that not all side effects and undesirable costs are known.  
 
D. DISCLOSURE, TRANSPARENCY AND STANDARDISATION 
The reasons for misalignment of interests are not solely to be found by the 
originators. Both retail and sophisticated investors also failed to take 
informed investment decisions with the effect of their risk exposure not 
commiserating to their set risk profile.71 Two explanations are available for 
this: either investors have not been in a position to assess the originator’s 
underwriting standards due to insufficient information, or they have acted 
                                                
67  Bank of International Settlement, ‘BCBS Consultative Document, Proposed 
enhancements to the Basel II framework’ (BIS, January 2009), 4. 
68 CRD3 impact assessment, 26. 
69 FSA Turner Review, 55. 
70 Ayadi (n 57) 4f; Kashyap (n 56) 23, 26. 
71 Eggert (n 33) 1303f. 
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irrationally and chosen not to assess the published information due to its 
complexity and information overload. Yet, higher returns of securitised 
products have let investors turn a blind eye on increased complexity. They 
have over-relied on credit ratings72 and on alleged safety structures such as 
credit enhancement73 and became subject to heuristic behaviour.74  
 
1. Insufficient disclosure 
Hitherto, regulators have addressed information asymmetry mainly by 
requiring full disclosure,75 which has been justified on grounds of the 
efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) as it was developed by Gilson 
and Kraakman. A stock’s price will reflect the true value of the company if 
rational investors have available all necessary information about the 
company in order to incorporate it into the stock’s price. However, the 
effectiveness of the ECMH on securitised markets of strong innovative 
forces is disputed, as it was recognised by Gilson and Kraakman already.76 
Schwarcz reaffirms that the ECMH does not apply to (private) debt markets 
as they are generally private in nature and no active trading environment 
exists for price finding.77 Taking a closer look at the model, two of its 
assumptions were not met in the securitisation market: investors did not 
always have access to all necessary information for proper price and risk 
evaluation; 78  and they acted irrationally. Thus, from an academic 
perspective, it is questionable whether full disclosure in the securitisation 
market will really put the investor in a position in which he is able to assess 
the originator’s screening efforts fully. 
Nevertheless, legislators adhere to the full disclosure principle. 
Additional disclosure and screening requirements are imposed on both 
originators and investors. Originators have to disclose not only their 
retention level (Art.122a sentence 1 CRD) but also provide investors with 
‘all materially relevant [loan-level] data’ concerning the underlying 
                                                
72 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Technical Committee, 
‘Unregulated Financial Markets and Products’ (Final Report, September 2009), 16. 
73 Eggert (n 33) 1303-1307. 
74 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009) 87(2) 
WashULRev 211, 222. 
75 Schwarcz (n 5) 1117. 
76 Ronald J Gilson and Reinier H Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ 
(1984) 70 VaLRev 549, 568, 585, 615-6. 
77 Schwarcz (n 5) 1116. 
78 Eggert (n 33) 1306; Emilios Avgouleas, ‘Financial Regulation, Behavioural Finance, 
and the Global Financial Crisis: In Search of a New Regulatory Model’ (2009) 9 JCLS 
23, 45. 
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exposures (sentence 2).79 This includes all information to enable them to 
assess the credit quality and performance, the cash flows and collateral 
supporting the exposure as well as to conduct stress tests thereof (hereafter: 
investor due diligence). Whereas it puts investors in a position to fulfil their 
role in theory, it is not clear whether they will perform their entrusted role 
also in practice or persist with heuristic behaviour.  
 
2. Information overload and standardisation 
Paredes elaborates on the limits of the regulatory full disclosure paradigm 
and points out the likelihood of investors behaving irrationally on the ground 
of ‘limited cognitive abilities to process information’.80 Full disclosure led to 
an overload of information, which backfired at its primary objective. Instead 
of empowering investors, they addressed the growing amount of information 
and its inherent complexity with heuristics and took over-simplified 
decisions.81 This idea is supported by Avgouleas who argues that proper risk 
evaluation necessitated proper financial sophistication.82  Paredes suggests in 
general that information overload needed to be considered more strongly in 
financial regulation;83 and in particular, either to scale back on mandatory 
disclosure or to improve the comparability, evaluation and standardisation of 
information for investors.84 Schwarcz considers disclosure by institutions to 
have been extensive enough. He argues that disclosure by financial 
institutions such as in prospectuses always complied with respective 
regulation.  As it was so extensive and complex institutions either failed to 
staff the necessary expertise or took a short cut by not assessing the 
information properly and instead reverted to credit rating reliance. 85 
Moreover, wholesale banks have already started to disclose loan-level data 
but argue that investors refrain from looking at it.86 Thus, scholars and 
markets attach greater importance to the limited effect of more disclosure. 
Investors either would fail to adequately analyse it or be overburdened 
thereby. 
                                                
79 See also CRR proposal, art 398. 
80 Troy Paredes, ‘Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation’ (2003) 81 WashULQ 417, 444.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Avgouleas (n 78) 45. 
83 Paredes (n 80), 484. 
84 Ibid, 474ff.  
85 Schwarcz (n 5) 1114f; see part IV on personal conflict of interest of credit rating 
agencies. 
86 Lloyds banker interview (n 36). 
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Nonetheless, European legislation aims at the prevention of the 
investor turning a blind eye on the disclosed information and of over-relying 
on credit ratings. Information overload and the complexity issue are 
addressed to a lesser extent by it. An investing credit institution has to 
demonstrate to the PRA that it has a thorough understanding of each of its 
individual securitisation positions and has procedures in place to assess the 
commensurateness with its own risk profile (BIPRU s9.15.11-13). Regular 
stress testing (BIPRU s9.15.12) as well as on-going performance monitoring 
of exemplarily specified information, including of loan level data, are 
required (BIPRU s9.15.14f).87 
While legislation has not addressed the growing complexity of 
information yet, both academics88 and public institutions89 have called for 
greater standardisation of information to enhance comparability and 
minimise complexity. Initiatives by the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the Bank of England (BoE) exist. Both institutions have developed eligibility 
criteria for each securitisation asset class with a twofold purpose: to provide 
a transparent framework determining which assets will be permitted as 
collateral in their internal lending operations; and to boost investor 
confidence in the securitisation market by enhancing standardisation and 
transparency. Originators and sponsors are asked to disclose loan-level data 
in a standardised format per asset class for which templates have been 
developed,90 containing around 180 to 240 questions. This information is to 
be made publicly and freely available so as to facilitate investor due 
diligence. While the ECB has supported the development of a single private 
loan-level data repository (European DataWarehouse GmbH)91, the BoE has 
decided not to mandate such an infrastructure but to ask merely for the 
information to be made publicly available. According to market forces, 
investors are already requiring originators to adhere to the Central Banks’ 
templates as this would ultimately add liquidity for trading purposes.92 Other 
                                                
87 CRD, art 122a (4)-(5); see also CRR proposal, art 395 and 396, which would impose 
additional risk weights in case of non-compliance due to negligence or omission.  
88 Schwarcz (n 74) 241; Paredes (n 80), 474ff. 
89  International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Global Developments in 
Securitization Regulation’ (Consultation Report, CR09/12, June 2012), 16f; BIS 
securitisation incentives, 22. 
90 BoE templates, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/eligiblecollateral.aspx; ECB 
templates, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/assets/loanlevel/transmission/html/index.en.html. 
91 European DataWarehouse, available at http://www.eurodw.eu/.   
92 Lloyds banker interview (n 36).  
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more recent market-led initiatives have been the Dutch Securitisation 
Standard for RMBS, developed by the Dutch Securitisation Association,93 
and the introduction of the PCS Label for ABS for meeting defined 
eligibility criteria developed by the UK based Prime Collateralised 
Securities.94 Hence, it remains positive that standardisation initiatives have 
gained momentum, but whether the Central Banks’ or the market approaches 
will prevail still remains to be seen.  
 
3. Complexity of information remains a major challenge 
The EU and respective UK legislation envisage to improve the foundation 
for a disclosure and transparency regime. By prescribing both originators to 
disclose all relevant data to investors and investors to engage in investor due 
diligence based on the disclosed data, the legislator adheres to the full 
disclosure regime and obliges investors to use it. However, it does not 
address the potential information overload problem of investors. Instead, 
legislators assumed that investors negligently did not assess information but 
over-relied on credit ratings. Nevertheless, thorough disclosure requirements 
are important in order to put investors in the position to perform its 
designated role properly in the first place: approach loan-level data critically, 
require premiums for uncertainty,95 and quantify the risks accordingly. After 
investors and scholars have called for more standardisation, the BoE and 
ECB were the first by having introduced respective templates to request 
information in a standardised format. Since then, market-led initiatives have 
followed in the Netherlands and UK emphasising that there is a clear 
demand to structure the disclosed information and counter regulatory 
initiatives. From my point of view, market-led initiatives constitute the best 
means to ensure that only relevant information is disclosed - avoiding 
information overload and minimising complexity - which in turn empowers 
sophisticated investors to regain control and align interests. It would also 
ensure that standards are internationally convergent, coordinated and 
amended timely taking into account the fact that the securitisation market is 
highly cross-jurisdictional. At the same time, it would guarantee that a 
sufficient degree of efficiency through standardisation is reached in order to 
strike a balance with regard to enhanced disclosure and costs. 
 
                                                
93 Dutch Securitisation Association, available at http://www.dutchsecuritisation.nl.  
94 Prime Collateralised Securities, available at http://pcsmarket.org/.  
95 Schwarcz (n 74) 262f. 
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E. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
In the GFC several imperfections in the credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) 
system were fortified, which jeopardised their role to provide information 
symmetry in the securitisation market. In the case of subprime RMBS and 
CDO market, CRAs failed to assess the creditworthiness of the underlying 
assets adequately, resulting in investment grade rated securities to default on 
a large scale and in delayed downgrading.96 The causes can be attributed to 
CRAs themselves, investors and financial regulation. This is generally 
considered to be the result of a mixture of problems: disproportionate 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings, organisational and personal conflict of 
interest (COI) within CRAs, and growing complexity of the securitised 
products resulting from continuous innovation and resecuritisation 97 
alongside with outdated methodologies and short-sighted historical data. 
 
1. Regulatory reliance 
For over a century, CRAs have been unregulated in Europe and the UK in 
light of constraining market and reputational forces.98 Only in 2004, IOSCO 
established a non-binding code of conduct.99 Today, there is a dominance of 
three US CRAs with no significant European or Asian competitor. It is the 
result not only of decades of consolidation, but also of a respective 
regulatory environment. The use of credit ratings for calculating capital 
requirements became mandatory for credit institutions since the 1988 Basel 
Accord. Only ratings of duly registered CRAs could be used; but the 
registration system was non-transparent and imposed high entry barriers.100 
This regulatory reliance, it is argued, has given ratings the status of a public 
good101 or even of ‘force of law’, 102 despite ratings being nothing but 
                                                
96 Kristina St. Charles, ‘Regulatory Imperialism: The Worldwide Export of European 
Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 18(2) Minnesota JIntlL 399, 
406. 
97 Schwarcz (n 74) 223; Richard Barley, ‘Ability to track risk has shrunk "forever" -
Moody's’ Reuters (online 6 January 2008), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/07/moodys-risk-idUSL0455354520080107.  
98 White (n 24) 2. 
99 International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals 
for Credit Rating Agencies’ (December 2004).  
100 White (n 24) 4.  
101 Schwarcz (n 5) 1120f.  
102 White (n 24) 3, 5.  
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opinions, or arguable ‘fact-based opinions’, protected by the first 
amendment of the US Constitution.103 
As a result, scholars not only call for less regulatory reliance on CRAs 
but also for less regulatory intervention to address the system’s 
shortcomings. Schwarcz opposes more regulation on the basis of the limited 
abilities of public institutions and governmental certification. 104  White 
favours the abolition of the non-transparent registration system to reduce 
entry barriers and stimulate competition.105 Advisors and credit institutions, 
constituting alternative ‘sources of creditworthiness’, should be relied upon 
by increasing their accountability. In turn, those measures would foster 
rating innovation of new technologies and methodologies.106 Furthermore, 
detailed regulation would be counterproductive by giving investors a false 
sense of security in ratings.107 
Nonetheless, EU legislators have pursued with regulation on grounds 
of the CRAs’ failure to deliver quality ratings in time.108 While the UK 
regulator would favour principles-based regulation, also referred to as the 
‘outcomes-focused approach’ by former FSA Chief Executive Sants,109 the 
European Institutions adopted a prescriptive Regulation (hereafter: CRA 
Regulation), based on the IOSCO code of conduct.110 Complementarily, they 
attempt to reduce regulatory reliance by increasing the duties of investing 
                                                
103 For the issue of legal effect of a (fact-based) opinion see: Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank v. Morgan Stanley (2012), opinion by S.A. Scheindlin, USD.J., 32ff.  
104 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Private Ordering of Public Markets: the Rating Agency Paradox’ 
[2002] UIllLRev 1, 20. 
105 White (n 24) 7-8; in affirmation: Claire A Hill, ‘Why did Rating Agencies do such a 
Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?’ (2010) Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 
10-18, 20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582539.  
106 White (n 24) 7-8.  
107 Letter from Michel Madelain, COO of Moody’s Investors Service Ltd. to Maria 
Valentza, Head of Securities Unit, DG Internal Market, European Commission (5 
September 2008) 7, available at https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/d239c220-ed02-4432-
a418-eabb4eb812da/Moody__s.pdf.  
108 Council Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L302/1, recital 10 (CRA 
Regulation).  
109 Harry McVea, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global 
Governance: the EU Strikes Back’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 701, 717f, referring to Hector Sants, 
‘Delivering intensive supervision and credible deterrence’ (Speech, The Reuters 
Newsmakers event, 12 March 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml.  
110 Council Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L302/1 (CRA Regulation), entry 
into force: December 2010. 
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financial institutions. CRD2 prescribes investing credit institutions to 
monitor the on-going performance of their securitisation exposures and 
thereby addresses their previous blind reliance on ratings. Failure to 
undertake a comprehensive due diligence will result in heavy capital 
penalties by means of risk-weights at deduction level.111 Thus, the current 
strategy of regulators is to continuously rely on CRAs, improve their internal 
structure and at the same time to increase the responsibilities of investing 
credit institutions. Concerns by scholars about imprudent regulatory reliance 
have not been effectively addressed yet. Only last year BCBS has proposed 
to reduce the ‘mechanic reliance on external ratings’ in its 2012 proposal for 
a revised securitisation framework.112 Whether institutional investors will 
live up to the prescribed standards remains also to be seen. After all, the 
rating business emerged since there was a strong demand of creditworthiness 
analysis in the first place.  
 
2. Conflict of Interests 
At the root of the CRAs’ failure to adequately assess the creditworthiness of 
structured products is the conflict of interest (COI). The organisational COI 
arises as the issuer of the securities is also the purchaser of the rating, a 
known shortcoming of the change to the issuer-pays model (IPM) in the 
1970s.113 The personal COI arose especially in the subprime market as the 
remuneration system of CRAs led their employees to overrate securities so 
as to realise short-term bonuses.114 
According to Schwarcz’s theory, the organisational COI is not a 
problem as long as CRAs do not ‘misbehave’.115 Indeed, the problem has not 
manifested in the traditional and transparent bond market.116 Pursuant to his 
theory misbehaviour does not occur despite missing public accountability 
because “negative reputational consequences [… would] far outweigh the 
fee a rating agency [… would be able to] charge for providing that 
[favourable] rating.”117 However, the COI has outweighed the reputational 
constrain since on the one hand the high margins of the subprime market 
                                                
111 CRD, art122a (5). 
112 Bank for International Settlement, ‘Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework’ 
(Consultative document) December 2012, 5. 
113 White (n 24) 4f. 
114 Christoph Kumpan, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Securitisation: Adjusting Incentives’, 
(2009) 9 JCLS 261, 274. 
115 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Private Ordering of Public Markets: the Rating Agency Paradox’ 
[2002] UIllLRev 1, 15. 
116 White (n 24) 6. 
117 Schwarcz (n 115) 18. 
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caused dependency and put issuers in a strong bargaining position, and on 
the other hand the given ratings were hardly transparent and reproducible.118 
Hence, White suggests reducing regulatory reliance to dilute their market 
power. 119  Alternatively, Kumpan suggests holding part of the issuer’s 
payment in escrow and to make full payment dependent on any subsequent 
rating adjustments, if they had been predictable. Similarly, it would work for 
remedying the personal COI.120 
Under the CRA Regulation, the COI will continue to exist as CRAs 
can continue to adhere to the IPM.121 To minimise its effect, article 6 
imposes the prescriptive obligation to avoid any COI affecting the issuance 
of credit ratings. Further detailed rules on organisational and operational 
requirements are laid out in Annex I section A and B. Article 7 addresses the 
personnel COI by prohibiting rating analysts from engaging in fee 
negotiations with the rated entity, by mandating gradual rotation between 
rating mandates and by requiring that their remuneration cannot be 
contingent on the fee paid by the rated entity.122 Hence, by refraining from 
prescribing a different business model, the European legislator has accepted 
the prevalence of the IPM and thus the COI. Its remedy is to impose 
prescriptive rules to mandate action or inaction instead of changing the 
business fundamentals and the origin of the problem. 
 
3. Complexity, innovation and outdated methodologies 
In the subprime market information asymmetry became wider than in the 
traditional bond market. The market’s complexity increased due to constant 
financial innovation such as (multiple) resecuritisation in the form of CDOs. 
In 2008, Moody’s recognised the limits of CRAs’ ability to determine risk 
timely in this market and to maintain ongoing information symmetry.123 
Furthermore, rating methodologies were outdated and based on insignificant 
short-term historical data especially for innovative and new products. 
Avgouleas describes this as the ‘mega paradox’: market participants 
                                                
118 White (n 24) 6. 
119 Ibid, 7. 
120 Kumpan (n 114)  285-288. 
121 See for detailed discussion Harry McVea, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, The Subprime 
Mortgage Debacle and Global Governance: the EU Strikes Back’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 701, 
720ff. 
122 CRA Regulation, art 7(2)-(5).  
123 Richard Barley, ‘Ability to track risk has shrunk "forever" -Moody's’ Reuters (online 6 
January 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/07/moodys-risk-
idUSL0455354520080107. 
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including sophisticated investors, while being aware of those drawbacks, 
blindly relied on the ratings instead of reviewing them.124  
Schwarcz attests that CRAs failed to detect the underlying correlation 
inherent in such complex securitised products, which were assumed to 
diversify risk.125 However, he argues that complexity and innovation cannot 
be prevented without affecting beneficial (re)securitisation transactions.126  
The CRA Regulation addresses complexity in two ways. It prescribes 
information and rating standards127 and non-issuance of a rating in case of 
complexity or lack of sufficient data impeding the issuance of a quality 
rating.128 Complementary, investors are being empowered to better review 
the ratings by requiring CRAs to disclose their methodologies, models and 
key assumptions.129 In particular, additional disclosure requirements apply 
for structured products, such as disclosing due diligence efforts and stress 
scenarios simulations. 130  Moreover, regulators consider it necessary to 
caution investors that they are dealing with structured products. CRAs will 
have to differentiate structured finance instruments ratings by the usage of 
another symbol.131 However, the measure has not gained much support both 
from scholars, CRAs and the UK authorities. They question the added value 
at highlighting the obvious132 point out the implementation difficulties in the 
absence of a clear definition of ‘structured finance instruments’,133 the 
disproportionate additional costs, 134  and the resulting international 
                                                
124 Avgouleas (n 78) 30. 
125 Schwarcz (n 74) 223. 
126 Ibid. 
127 CRA Regulation, art 8(2)-(6). 
128 Ibid Annex I, s D(I)(4).  
129 CRA Regulation, art 8(1). 
130 CRD Regulation, recital 25, annex I, s D(II)(1)-(4); see also, McVea (n 121) 727. 
131 CRA Regulation, art 10(3); International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 
‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’ (Revised, May 2008), para 
3.5(b) (IOSCO CRA revised); Thomas MJ Möllers, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies: 
the new US and EU law – important steps or much ado about nothing?’ (2009) 4(4) 
CMLR 477, 490.  
132 Edmund Parker and Miles Bake, ‘Regulation of credit rating agencies in Europe’ 
(2009) 24(7) JIBFL 401, 402ff. 
133  International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Technical Committee, ‘A 
Review of Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (March 2009), 13; Letter by Moody’s (Fn 107) 24. 
134 HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, ‘Joint response by HM Treasury, the FSA 
and the Bank of England to the Commission consultation on a draft Directive/ Regulation 
on credit rating agencies (CRAs); and policy options to address the problem of excessive 
reliance on credit ratings’ (5 September 2008) 20f, available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/c
redit_agencies/authorities/uk_ministrypdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.  
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divergence caused in ratings.135 Hence, the EU legislator remedies the 
subprime market’s complexity by setting minimum rating and information 
standards as well as by enabling investors through mandatory disclosure to 
reproduce and verify the basis of a given rating. Thereby, it does not reduce 
the CRA’s importance but increases investors’ responsibility. 
 
4. Are prescriptive rules really the best way to move forward? 
Thus, it can be held that European authorities have refrained from 
intervening radically in the CRA system. Regulatory reliance on CRAs has 
not been reduced, the issuer-pays-model from which the COI emanates will 
be maintained and innovation and complexity in the subprime market will 
continue to exist, increasing the probability of incorrect ratings. Instead, 
within the CRA Regulation a prescriptive rule set has been adopted, which 
aims at improving the CRAs’ internal structures. Fundamental changes have 
been omitted. Two groups are intended to serve as a balance to the CRAs: 
investors and regulators. Investors are to monitor better their securitisation 
exposures and review the ratings, which is why methodologies and due 
diligence results are to be disclosed by CRAs. In the author’s opinion, these 
are suitable means to establish checks and balances; by creating the basis for 
information equilibrium, investors will bear the responsibilities for their 
investments. However, it is questionable whether they can really do a better 
job given that CRAs will always have greater expertise as this is their core 
business. Regulators will have to supervise compliance of the descriptive 
rules by the CRAs. Here, the legislator should be cautious of regulatory 
over-reliance given the limited capacities of public institutions and their 
finite budgets. Determining that the issuance of a rating as not appropriate 
due to excessive complexity and insufficient historical data might constitute 
a very subjective element and thus difficult to prove. Moreover, legal 
accountability of CRAs has remained unchanged; any legislative change 
would have little effect as long as ratings are still recognised as opinions in 
the US. Changes would have to be made by the US courts or at an 
international level. As a result, the century of non-regulation of CRAs has 
come to an end. A new set of prescriptive rules has been adopted in hope of 
improving the CRAs’ conduct. However, as fundamental structural 
deficiencies of the CRAs’ system were not addressed, it remains to be seen 
whether the CRA Regulation is nothing more than a political declaration of 
intent to address the shortcomings.  
                                                
135 Charles (n 96) 446. 
 Regulation of Securitised Products post the Financial Crisis 
 
 136 
F. CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed the regulatory developments in the structured 
market since the global financial crisis. The securitisation business grew 
significantly for two decades until an even stronger contraction in the 
summer of 2007. The products in question were at the heart of the crisis. 
Since then, six years have passed and legislators have adopted respective 
reforms to address the shortcomings in the securitisation market. The main 
problems were centred around four areas: first, misalignment of interests 
between investors and originators; second, inadequate capital rules failing to 
reflect the actual risk exposures; third, insufficient disclosure and 
information overload of investors; and fourth, CRAs failing to give quality 
ratings. These four shortcomings have been analysed separately throughout 
this paper. Although regulatory measures have been adopted to tackle each 
one of them, they have either been insufficient or caused new deficiencies to 
occur. 
The interests of originators and investors started to misalign as a result 
of the replacement of the OTH-model with the OTD-model. Originators 
failed to maintain the same careful underwriting and screening standards. To 
reverse this trend and to increase incentives, the legislator introduced the 
retention rule, which is only to be complied with where investors constitute 
credit institutions. The requirements prescribe that sponsors or originators 
retain five percent of the underlying assets; this can be achieved through one 
of four methods, to be decided at the originator’s discretion. However, the 
effectiveness of both criteria is not yet clear. In many circumstances, 
previous voluntary retention of at least equal size gives reason to question 
the effectiveness of rule. It was also held the level not to be more than an 
approximation in light of missing evidence as to its origin. This is similar for 
all four methods. Research indicates that their effectiveness varies depending 
on the economic climate, although investors tend to demand vertical slice 
retention of originators. If so many factors are still uncertain, the regulator is 
to be careful not to allow for arbitrage opportunities. Hence, the retention 
requirement might do nothing more than set minimum requirements and 
might actually have little effect in practice: skin-in-the-game has existed 
before and the rule’s scope does not expand to investing entities such as 
hedge funds.  
Previous capital requirements were little nuanced with respect to the 
complexity of securitised products and provided for arbitrage opportunities 
in accounting books. To remedy the former, the definition of resecuritisation 
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was introduced. The scope of the definition is very broad so as to ensure that 
products with the smallest securitisation exposure and added complexity will 
also be covered. In addition, the risk-weights for those resecuritised products 
were increased so that credit institutions holding them on their books would 
have higher capital requirements. To avoid additional arbitrage opportunities 
between the trading and the banking books, the risk-weights were equalised 
for securitised exposures. However, there is no evidence of the origin or 
effectiveness of the increased risk-weight levels. The danger lies in them 
being too low, as was identified ex post in the case of the Basel I capital 
requirement levels. Nevertheless, it is probable that those reforms have 
already contributed to the decline in the issuance of resecuritised products. 
On the other hand, investors might also have realised that the CDOs’ higher 
margins and low risk-weights have come at the price of high correlation in 
the low state of the economy. The levelling of the accounting books will 
have the effect of credit institutions reducing their overall securitisation 
exposures as higher capital charges will apply now. Likely, those exposures 
will be transferred to non-regulated entities and shadow-banks. As a result, 
regulatory capital reforms will have a chilling effect on the securitisation risk 
exposure held by financial institutions. An undesired consequence could be 
that the risks are transferred to non-regulated entities and shadow banks, 
where any level of monitoring will even be harder.  
Legislators consider both originators not to have disclosed sufficient 
information and investors not to have analysed the disclosed information 
adequately. Instead, they are said to have relied blindly on credit ratings. On 
the other hand, scholars and markets argue that sufficient information was 
available but that the increased complexity led to information overload. This 
explains why the envisaged solutions partly differ. Legislators mandate 
originators to disclose additional loan-level data and investors to include the 
data in their investment decisions. Scholars promote further standardisation 
of existing disclosure to increase comparability and information assessment 
efficiency. Concerning standardisation, the original drive came from the 
ECB and BoE, which have each developed templates for their internal 
lending operations to receive standardised loan-level information. This 
information is made publicly available with the idea of reducing complexity 
and addressing the information overload faced by investors. If everything 
goes as planned, investors will make informed investment decisions. While 
such central bank measures seem to have been appreciated by investors, 
other market-led approaches have been taken in the Netherlands and the UK, 
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which should facilitate international convergence. Given that standardisation 
has gained momentum, there is hope that the investors’ information overload 
can be addressed effectively as benchmarking and quick information 
evaluation become possible.  
The increasing complexity of innovative securitised products, internal 
conflict of interests and regulatory over-reliance led CRAs to give incorrect 
and biased credit ratings in the subprime market: substantial downgrading 
followed after the crisis broke out, especially in the US RMBS and CDO 
market. Still, the legislator has hardly reduced its reliance on CRAs, 
arguably on grounds of missing alternatives. Instead, it aims to tackle the 
CRAs’ conflict of interests with prescriptive rules, which are to improve 
their internal governance structure. As an additional counterbalance, CRAs 
will have to disclose their rating methodologies, stress tests and data, so that 
investors can review the given ratings and, where applicable, question their 
validity. Whereas this seems to be a sound line of reasoning in theory, there 
may be some drawbacks. Investors will have little incentive and less 
expertise to review the ratings, given that they outsourced the rating service 
purposefully at the outset. Moreover, prescriptive rules demand supervision 
by regulators. In times of stringent budgets, the legislator should be cautious 
of not overburdening its regulators. Thus, the CRA Regulation might have a 
stronger political than regulatory effect. At best, the rules incentivise 
investors to stop relying blindly on credit ratings and to exercise their market 
power to restore the reputational restrain mechanism of CRAs, as it has 
worked well in the bond market.  
The individual analyses of the measures adopted reveals that they 
barely succeed in remedying the addressed shortcoming. Whether these 
measures have the envisaged effect of improving the overall securitisation 
process is difficult to ascertain without seeing the effects of the reforms over 
time. Overall, the measures might end up not having the radical effect on the 
securitisation business hoped for by some politicians. However, this is not 
necessarily negative. The regulator is right to be cautious about interfering in 
complex markets, as is the case for securitisation. Many stakeholders are 
affected and the precise consequences of each regulatory measure are 
difficult to anticipate. Thus, determining fixed retention levels and risk-
weights without proper grounds justifying such levels can cause more harm 
than good, for instance by providing arbitrage opportunities. The risk of 
going beyond what is necessary should not be underestimated. The risk lies 
not only in preventing over-risky securitised products but also in closing 
down the whole securitisation market.  The reason for this product’s success 
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over two decades is that it constituted a new funding method. As the 
European Commission affirms, sound securitisation structures can play an 
important role in providing financing to private markets, including to small 
and medium enterprises.136 Ultimately, securitisation could have potentially 
been not only the way in to, but also the way out of, the crisis.  
The limits and negative externalities of regulation should also be 
borne in mind. Prescriptive laws, as are common in European regulation, are 
generally past-looking. This is adequate to prevent a repetition of the same 
crisis. Nevertheless, regulation rarely helps to anticipate the next crisis. It is 
a paradox that regulators are now regulating the securitisation market, which 
was the innovative side-effect of capital regulation in Basel I. This raises the 
question whether the currently enacted regulatory regime will lead to a 
future crisis. Another side-effect is that it unlikely achieves the deterrence of 
certain transactions. Instead, it might force business activities into 
unregulated markets. As the CRD, and thus most of the measures discussed, 
only apply to credit institutions, there is a real likelihood that transactions 
move to non-regulated entities and markets, such as shadow banks and 
hedge funds. Then, regulators will not even be in a position to monitor and 
intervene. 
An alternative to imposing prescriptive rules could be for the regulator 
to support structural and market-led reforms. Rules need to be supervised, 
which raises the question of regulatory capacity in times of tight public 
budgets. This problem becomes especially apparent for the CRA Regulation. 
Here, a market-led solution might be more appropriate if it was able to 
restore the CRAs’ reputational constraint, which has proven to work well in 
the bond market. The market should also be more engaged in standardisation 
setting of loan-level data. It would avoid useless information being 
disclosed, provide for flexibility, enhance the potential for effective 
benchmarking, and make standards more likely internationally convergent. 
Nonetheless, regulators or public institutions could give start-up aid in cases 
where initial set-up costs are too great.  
To conclude, the adopted regulatory measures concerning securitised 
products have a rather limited effect overall. This seems to be especially the 
case for retention requirements and the rules concerning CRAs. However, 
this is not necessarily a serious problem if there are no foreseeable 
consequences following regulatory intervention. In this case, it is better for 
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the regulator to be cautious and to avoid unnecessary compliance costs for 
market participants. Instead, market forces should be supported in 
developing adequate solutions, which, in turn, could be monitored to ensure 
that regulators are sufficiently informed and, therefore, able to intervene 
promptly when necessary. 
 
